Microsoft · 27 May 1995

The Web is the Next Platform

An engineer’s detailed plan for treating the web as a platform in its own right, written the day after Gates’ memo.

Author
Ben Slivka, Engineer
Written
27 May 1995
Document
Internal memo, later a US v. Microsoft trial exhibit
Notes
9: 7 fact, 2 editorial
Last reviewed

The memo

Short excerpts from the full 17-page memo, which the Justice Department publishes as trial exhibit 21; Slivka’s 2017 post reproduces its opening section.

Excerpts · 9 notes
Microsoft1995
From:
Ben Slivka
Date:
5/27/95
Subject:
The Web is the Next Platform

The Web (as I will loosely refer to the Internet and it’s evolving data formats and protocols) exists today as a collection of technologies that deliver some interesting solutions today, and will grow rapidly in the coming years into a full-fledged platform that will rival -- and even surpass -- Microsoft Windows. (Fact note 1)Fact · 1With hindsightIn the plaintiffs’ list of trial exhibits in United States v. Microsoft, served on 13 October 1998, this memo is Exhibit 21, dated 05/27/95, listed next to Bill Gates’s “The Internet Tidal Wave” (Exhibit 20, 05/26/95). In its findings of fact of 5 November 1999 the court wrote that server-based computing, middleware and open-source development, fuelled by the internet, “could oust the PC operating system from its position as the primary platform for applications development”.SourcesU.S. Department of JusticeAppendix B - Plaintiffs' List Of Trial Exhibits13 Oct 1998U.S. Department of JusticeU.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings Of Fact5 Nov 1999

[ … ] Not shown: A Forrester “SuperWeb” report, and thanks to reviewers.

1. The Web is an application platform (complete with APIs, data formats, and protocols) that threatens Windows -- many corporate developers and ISVs could develop and deliver their solutions more quickly, to a wider audience, with the Web than they can with Windows or MSN as it exists today.

2. If Microsoft is to influence the Web, we must have broad, standards-based Web support in our products -- we have to be the product supplier of choice for all key existing Web technologies -- clients, servers, and publishing tools, at a minimum. (Editorial note 2)Editorial · 2Known at the timePoints 2 and 3 set the order: first ship the standards everyone else ships, then use the share to steer them. It concedes that Microsoft’s own formats and protocols, including MSN’s, lose for now, and it bets that share bought on open standards can later be turned into influence.

3. Once we have market and mind share on the Web with our products, we can take a leadership role in expanding and shaping the Web.

[ … ] Not shown: What the web already does, from wine shops to chat.

My nightmare scenario is that the Web grows into a rich application platform in an operating system-neutral way, and then a company like Siemens or Matsushita comes out with a $500 “WebMachine” that attaches to a TV. (Fact note 3)Fact · 3With hindsightIn November 1999 the court found that consumers who might choose “information appliances” over a PC for e-mail, browsing and games “will, for the foreseeable future, remain small” in number. It also found that any PC with a browser and an internet connection could reach applications hosted on web sites, as network computers could.SourceU.S. Department of JusticeU.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings Of Fact5 Nov 1999 This WebMachine will let the customer do all the cool Internet stuff, plus manage home finances (all the storage is at the server side), and play games. When faced with the choice between a $500 box (RISC CPU, 4-8Mb RAM, no hard disk, ...) and a $2KPentium/P6 Windows machine, the 2/3rds of homes that don’t have a PC may find the $500 machine pretty attractive!

[ … ] Not shown: Two paramount attributes; the first: server-side applications.

2. Universal data formats and viewers enable the web to grow in richness and power -- the Web is a platform that no one controls and everyone can enhance. (Editorial note 4)Editorial · 4Known at the timeThis sits uneasily with the memo’s own plan. A platform that no one controls is the reason the web threatens Windows, and the memo then proposes that Microsoft take the controlling role Windows gave it. It names the risk that Netscape will “pull a Windows” but not the risk that the open web resists anyone doing so.

[ … ] Not shown: Four example sites, from a wine shop to a movie database.

If we don’t quickly become the supplier of choice for Internet technology, the Internet will grow and change under someone else’s influence, and we risk losing the standard setting role (with the attendant profit margins) we have come to enjoy with MS-DOS and Windows (and Office).

[ … ] Not shown: MSN’s proprietary choices, the rivals, and a UNIX-style outcome.

On the other hand, it is also possible that some company will “pull a Windows” by taking a leadership position of enhancing the Web -- this is certainly the strategy that Netscape is pursuing! We have to assume that at least some of our competitors have figured out how Windows won, and are trying to recreate that strategy on the Web.

[ … ] Not shown: OS/2 and LAN Manager: lessons on compatibility.

At a high-level, this is very clear. We should support all of the key internet standards and become key suppliers of Internet technology to all comers. In parallel, we should be extending the web with as many Microsoft technologies as possible, even if we have to modify those technologies in ways not original intended by their designers. (Fact note 5)Fact · 5With hindsightOn 12 March 1996 Microsoft released a developer prerelease of Internet Explorer 3.0, describing it as the first internet client to integrate its ActiveX Technologies. It listed ActiveX Controls, the Java language, JavaScript and “Visual Basic, Scripting Edition”, alongside the W3C’s HTML specifications for tables, objects, scripts and style sheets.SourceMicrosoft (Internet Archive copy)Microsoft Activates the Internet With Prerelease Version Of Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.012 Mar 1996

[ … ] Not shown: Goals, key issues, BlackBird and the “SuperWeb” architecture.

VBA is clearly preferred, but we need to evaluate it’s size and performance (IEXPLORE.EXE is <600K right now), and if another language (like Java) has immense momentum, we would have to consider going with that language. (Fact note 6)Fact · 6With hindsightOn 12 March 1996, at its Professional Developers Conference, Microsoft announced it had concluded an agreement to license Sun Microsystems’ Java technology “for inclusion in Microsoft products”, with Java support in Internet Explorer 3.0 using a just-in-time compiler.SourceMicrosoft (Internet Archive copy)Microsoft And Sun Microsystems Conclude Agreement To License Technology For Java12 Mar 1996 Victor Stone (in ACT) is building (has built?) a lightweight VBA subset, so that is obviously very attractive. Netscape has announced (5/23) they are incorporating Java into the next release of their browser.

[ … ] Not shown: HTML extensions, controls, servers, publishing; disclaimers on OLE.

My team owns the universal client (at least for HTML, mannyv may own VRML). Our Internet Explorer is in beta now with Plus!, and we RTM 7/14. We have lots to do after 7/14 -- I hope to get this all done by 7/1/96 (Fact note 7)Fact · 7With hindsightThe court found that Microsoft released Internet Explorer 1.0 in July 1995 and bundled it with the first version of Windows 95 licensed to manufacturers. Internet Explorer 3.0 was released on 13 August 1996, “available for download at no charge”, a little after the 7/1/96 target here.SourcesU.S. Department of JusticeU.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings Of Fact5 Nov 1999Microsoft (Internet Archive copy)Microsoft Launches Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0 With Exclusive, Free Content Offers From Top Web Sites13 Aug 1996 (with interim releases in Sep 95 and Feb 96):

2. Support (light-weight) OCX “embedding” in HTML

3. Support scripting for HTML (and VRML)

[ … ] Not shown: Further browser work, and the Windows Shell’s “page and link” model.

4. Tight integration of Internet Explorer and the Shell (Fact note 8)Fact · 8With hindsightWhen the Justice Department sued on 18 May 1998 it charged that Microsoft “intends to tie unlawfully its IE Internet browser software to its new Windows 98 operating system”, and that it had required PC manufacturers to license and install Internet Explorer as a condition of licensing Windows 95.SourceU.S. Department of JusticeJustice Department Files Antitrust Suit Against Microsoft for Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer Software Markets18 May 1998 (shell would provide a “shell viewer control” that fits into the universal viewer frame).

[ … ] Not shown: Plans for MSN, Office, Help and other groups; a market table.

The client just helps us sell Windows; we need to make it ubiquitous so that we can control the evolution of the Web. (Fact note 9)Fact · 9With hindsightThe court found that from early 1996 to the late summer of 1998 Internet Explorer’s share of all browser usage “rose from about five percent to around fifty percent”, while Navigator’s fell from above seventy percent to around fifty. It found that after Internet Explorer 1.0, senior Microsoft executives “remained engrossed with maximizing Internet Explorer's share of browser usage”, which Paul Maritz called “job #1.”SourceU.S. Department of JusticeU.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings Of Fact5 Nov 1999

[ … ] Not shown: Other markets; the “Server Farms” row is priority 2.

A phone/cable company business -- just leasing disk space, CPU cycles, and bandwidth to customers to put up their content. Margins are probably not high.

[ … ] Not shown: Groups that each see a different web, and a Netscape release.

All 9 notes and their sources
  1. will grow rapidly in the coming years into a full-fledged platform that will rival -- and even surpass -- Microsoft Windows.Fact · 1With hindsightIn the plaintiffs’ list of trial exhibits in United States v. Microsoft, served on 13 October 1998, this memo is Exhibit 21, dated 05/27/95, listed next to Bill Gates’s “The Internet Tidal Wave” (Exhibit 20, 05/26/95). In its findings of fact of 5 November 1999 the court wrote that server-based computing, middleware and open-source development, fuelled by the internet, “could oust the PC operating system from its position as the primary platform for applications development”.SourcesU.S. Department of JusticeAppendix B - Plaintiffs' List Of Trial Exhibits13 Oct 1998U.S. Department of JusticeU.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings Of Fact5 Nov 1999Back to the passage
  2. we have to be the product supplier of choice for all key existing Web technologies -- clients, servers, and publishing tools, at a minimum.Editorial · 2Known at the timePoints 2 and 3 set the order: first ship the standards everyone else ships, then use the share to steer them. It concedes that Microsoft’s own formats and protocols, including MSN’s, lose for now, and it bets that share bought on open standards can later be turned into influence.Back to the passage
  3. a company like Siemens or Matsushita comes out with a $500 “WebMachine” that attaches to a TV.Fact · 3With hindsightIn November 1999 the court found that consumers who might choose “information appliances” over a PC for e-mail, browsing and games “will, for the foreseeable future, remain small” in number. It also found that any PC with a browser and an internet connection could reach applications hosted on web sites, as network computers could.SourceU.S. Department of JusticeU.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings Of Fact5 Nov 1999Back to the passage
  4. the Web is a platform that no one controls and everyone can enhance.Editorial · 4Known at the timeThis sits uneasily with the memo’s own plan. A platform that no one controls is the reason the web threatens Windows, and the memo then proposes that Microsoft take the controlling role Windows gave it. It names the risk that Netscape will “pull a Windows” but not the risk that the open web resists anyone doing so.Back to the passage
  5. In parallel, we should be extending the web with as many Microsoft technologies as possible, even if we have to modify those technologies in ways not original intended by their designers.Fact · 5With hindsightOn 12 March 1996 Microsoft released a developer prerelease of Internet Explorer 3.0, describing it as the first internet client to integrate its ActiveX Technologies. It listed ActiveX Controls, the Java language, JavaScript and “Visual Basic, Scripting Edition”, alongside the W3C’s HTML specifications for tables, objects, scripts and style sheets.SourceMicrosoft (Internet Archive copy)Microsoft Activates the Internet With Prerelease Version Of Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.012 Mar 1996Back to the passage
  6. if another language (like Java) has immense momentum, we would have to consider going with that language.Fact · 6With hindsightOn 12 March 1996, at its Professional Developers Conference, Microsoft announced it had concluded an agreement to license Sun Microsystems’ Java technology “for inclusion in Microsoft products”, with Java support in Internet Explorer 3.0 using a just-in-time compiler.SourceMicrosoft (Internet Archive copy)Microsoft And Sun Microsystems Conclude Agreement To License Technology For Java12 Mar 1996Back to the passage
  7. I hope to get this all done by 7/1/96Fact · 7With hindsightThe court found that Microsoft released Internet Explorer 1.0 in July 1995 and bundled it with the first version of Windows 95 licensed to manufacturers. Internet Explorer 3.0 was released on 13 August 1996, “available for download at no charge”, a little after the 7/1/96 target here.SourcesU.S. Department of JusticeU.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings Of Fact5 Nov 1999Microsoft (Internet Archive copy)Microsoft Launches Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0 With Exclusive, Free Content Offers From Top Web Sites13 Aug 1996Back to the passage
  8. Tight integration of Internet Explorer and the ShellFact · 8With hindsightWhen the Justice Department sued on 18 May 1998 it charged that Microsoft “intends to tie unlawfully its IE Internet browser software to its new Windows 98 operating system”, and that it had required PC manufacturers to license and install Internet Explorer as a condition of licensing Windows 95.SourceU.S. Department of JusticeJustice Department Files Antitrust Suit Against Microsoft for Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer Software Markets18 May 1998Back to the passage
  9. we need to make it ubiquitous so that we can control the evolution of the Web.Fact · 9With hindsightThe court found that from early 1996 to the late summer of 1998 Internet Explorer’s share of all browser usage “rose from about five percent to around fifty percent”, while Navigator’s fell from above seventy percent to around fifty. It found that after Internet Explorer 1.0, senior Microsoft executives “remained engrossed with maximizing Internet Explorer's share of browser usage”, which Paul Maritz called “job #1.”SourceU.S. Department of JusticeU.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings Of Fact5 Nov 1999Back to the passage

What happened next

Dated events, each with its source. They are what followed the memo, not proof that it caused them.

  1. 2 mos later

    Microsoft releases Internet Explorer 1.0 and bundles it with the first version of Windows 95 licensed to PC manufacturers.

    U.S. Department of Justice

  2. 10 mos later

    At its Professional Developers Conference Microsoft releases a developer prerelease of Internet Explorer 3.0 with ActiveX Controls and scripting, and announces a licence for Sun’s Java technology.

    Microsoft (Internet Archive copy)Microsoft (Internet Archive copy)

  3. 1 yr 3 mos later

    Microsoft releases Internet Explorer 3.0 to the web, available for download at no charge.

    Microsoft (Internet Archive copy)

  4. 3 yrs later

    The Justice Department sues Microsoft, charging that it required PC manufacturers to install Internet Explorer and intends to tie it to Windows 98. Twenty states and the District of Columbia file a similar action.

    U.S. Department of Justice

  5. 4 yrs 6 mos later

    The court’s findings of fact put Internet Explorer’s share of browser usage at around fifty percent by late summer 1998, up from about five percent in early 1996.

    U.S. Department of Justice

  6. 6 yrs 1 mo later

    The Court of Appeals rules. The Justice Department says the court “found that Microsoft had engaged in illegal conduct to maintain its operating system monopoly”.

    U.S. Department of Justice

The calls, against the record

Each claim in the memo’s own words, the evidence, and our reading of it. Verdicts are editorial.

  1. Held up

    “we have to be the product supplier of choice for all key existing Web technologies -- clients, servers, and publishing tools, at a minimum.”

    Evidence

    The court found that Internet Explorer’s share of all browser usage rose from about five percent in early 1996 to around fifty percent by late summer 1998.

    U.S. Department of Justice

    Our reading Editorial

    On the client, Internet Explorer drew level with Navigator by late summer 1998. The court attributed much of the rise to distribution deals, finding that the AOL deal “caused an enormous surge in Internet Explorer's usage share”. This page does not test servers or publishing tools.

  2. Held up

    “if another language (like Java) has immense momentum, we would have to consider going with that language.”

    Evidence

    On 12 March 1996 Microsoft announced it had concluded an agreement to license Sun’s Java technology, with Java support in Internet Explorer 3.0.

    Microsoft (Internet Archive copy)

    Our reading Editorial

    Microsoft did go with Java within a year, while also backing its own Visual Basic scripting. What it did with Java afterwards is outside this page.

  3. Open

    “the 2/3rds of homes that don’t have a PC may find the $500 machine pretty attractive!”

    Evidence

    In November 1999 the court found that consumers choosing information appliances over a PC would “for the foreseeable future, remain small” in number.

    U.S. Department of Justice

    Our reading Editorial

    By 1999 the cheap web box had not arrived in numbers. The memo set no date, and this page has no source on later phones and tablets, which Slivka himself counts as the WebMachine he underestimated.

  4. Missed

    “A phone/cable company business -- just leasing disk space, CPU cycles, and bandwidth to customers to put up their content. Margins are probably not high.”

    Evidence

    Amazon’s 2025 annual report shows AWS operating income of $45,606 million on net sales of $128,725 million, a margin of about 35%.

    AmazonBen Slivka

    Our reading Editorial

    Renting out disk space and computing became a high-margin business. Slivka himself later called this call “quite wrong”. The memo was guessing about 1995 server farms, not cloud computing, so the miss is about the business model, not about anyone foreseeing AWS.

  5. Open

    “will grow rapidly in the coming years into a full-fledged platform that will rival -- and even surpass -- Microsoft Windows.”

    Evidence

    In 1999 the court found that server-based computing, middleware and open-source development “could oust the PC operating system from its position as the primary platform for applications development”.

    U.S. Department of Justice

    Our reading Editorial

    In November 1999 the court treated the threat as real but not yet realised. Whether and when the web surpassed Windows needs evidence this page does not have.

Takeaways Editorial

  1. Join the standard before you steer it

    Slivka puts support for the web’s existing standards first and influence second, and gives up Microsoft’s own formats to get there. On a platform you do not own, share comes from shipping what everyone already uses.

  2. Name the cheap substitute

    The memo’s threat is not a rival operating system but a $500 box that makes the PC unnecessary for most of what a household wants. Describe the threat as the alternative the customer would buy, at its price.

  3. How a dominant firm wins share matters

    The memo wants the browser ubiquitous so Microsoft can “control the evolution of the Web”. Internet Explorer’s share did rise, and in 2001 the Court of Appeals found that Microsoft had engaged in illegal conduct to maintain its operating system monopoly. A plan that leans on an existing monopoly needs a legal test as well as a market one.

Practise the strategy skills in this memo

Socratify is an interview coach. Each link opens a practice session with this memo as the case; nothing is sent until you choose to start.