Amazon · 1998

1997 Letter to Shareholders

“It’s all about the long term”: Amazon will make investment decisions for long-term market leadership, not short-term profit.

Author
Jeff Bezos, CEO
Written
1998
Document
Shareholder letter
Notes
8: 6 fact, 2 editorial
Last reviewed

The memo

Short excerpts from Jeff Bezos’ letter to shareholders in Amazon’s 1997 Annual Report; the full text is on Amazon’s site, linked here.

Excerpts · 8 notes
Amazon1998
To:
Our shareholders
From:
Jeffrey P. Bezos
Date:
1997 Annual Report

Amazon.com passed many milestones in 1997: by year-end, we had served more than 1.5 million customers, yielding 838% revenue growth to $147.8 million, and extended our market leadership despite aggressive competitive entry.

But this is Day 1 for the Internet and, if we execute well, for Amazon.com. (Fact note 1)Fact · 1With hindsightBezos kept the phrase. His 2016 letter, on how to fend off “Day 2”, says “Day 2 is stasis” and closes: “As always, I attach a copy of our original 1997 letter. It remains Day 1.”SourceAmazon investor relations2016 Letter to Shareholders2017

[ … ] Not shown: Personalisation, larger rivals moving online, and a window of opportunity.

This strategy is not without risk: it requires serious investment and crisp execution against established franchise leaders.

It’s All About the Long Term

We believe that a fundamental measure of our success will be the shareholder value we create over the long term. This value will be a direct result of our ability to extend and solidify our current market leadership position. The stronger our market leadership, the more powerful our economic model. Market leadership can translate directly to higher revenue, higher profitability, greater capital velocity, and correspondingly stronger returns on invested capital.

Our decisions have consistently reflected this focus. We first measure ourselves in terms of the metrics most indicative of our market leadership: customer and revenue growth, the degree to which our customers continue to purchase from us on a repeat basis, and the strength of our brand. (Editorial note 2)Editorial · 2Known at the timeThe letter tells shareholders which numbers to judge it by before it reports them: customers, repeat purchases and brand, not profit. The results section then reports exactly those. It is a clear standard, and one a company could meet in full while still losing money.SourceAmazonAmazon’s original 1997 letter to shareholders1998

[ … ] Not shown: Continued aggressive investment in customers, brand and infrastructure.

Because of our emphasis on the long term, we may make decisions and weigh tradeoffs differently than some companies. Accordingly, we want to share with you our fundamental management and decision-making approach so that you, our shareholders, may confirm that it is consistent with your investment philosophy:

We will continue to focus relentlessly on our customers.

We will continue to make investment decisions in light of long-term market leadership considerations rather than short-term profitability considerations or short-term Wall Street reactions. (Fact note 3)Fact · 3With hindsightOn 2 February 2005 Amazon introduced Amazon Prime, $79 a year for unlimited two-day shipping, which Bezos called “expensive for the Company in the short-term”. His letter in the 2005 annual report put Free Super Saver Shipping and Prime among choices “expensive in the short term and—we believe—important and valuable in the long term”.SourcesAmazon press centerAmazon.com Announces Record Free Cash Flow Fueled by Lower Prices and Free Shipping; Introduces New Express Shipping Program -- Amazon Prime2 Feb 2005Amazon investor relations2005 Annual Report2006

[ … ] Not shown: Measuring programmes analytically, and learning from failures.

We will make bold rather than timid investment decisions where we see a sufficient probability of gaining market leadership advantages. Some of these investments will pay off, others will not (Fact note 4)Fact · 4With hindsightOn 13 March 2006 Amazon announced Amazon S3, “storage for the Internet”. In the 2006 annual report Bezos described AWS as a new business for “a new customer set … software developers”. By 2025 AWS revenue was $129 billion, and Andy Jassy wrote of AWS’s early ideas: “Others didn’t succeed.”SourcesAmazon Web ServicesAnnouncing Amazon S3 - Simple Storage Service13 Mar 2006Amazon investor relations2006 Annual Report2007Amazon investor relations2025 Annual Report2026, and we will have learned another valuable lesson in either case.

When forced to choose between optimizing the appearance of our GAAP accounting and maximizing the present value of future cash flows (Fact note 5)Fact · 5With hindsightIn his 2004 letter Bezos called free cash flow per share Amazon’s “ultimate financial measure” and quoted this line back in shortened form, as “optimizing GAAP accounting”. The 2025 annual report still says: “Our financial focus is on long-term, sustainable growth in free cash flow.”SourcesAmazon investor relations2004 letter to shareholders2005Amazon investor relations2025 Annual Report2026, we’ll take the cash flows.

[ … ] Not shown: Sharing strategic thinking with shareholders when making bold choices.

We will work hard to spend wisely and maintain our lean culture. We understand the importance of continually reinforcing a cost-conscious culture, particularly in a business incurring net losses. (Fact note 6)Fact · 6Known at the timeAmazon’s Form 10-K for 1997, signed on 30 March 1998, reports net losses of $27.6 million for 1997 and $5.8 million for 1996.SourceAmazon, Form 10-K (investor relations copy)Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 199730 Mar 1998

We will balance our focus on growth with emphasis on long-term profitability and capital management. At this stage, we choose to prioritize growth because we believe that scale is central to achieving the potential of our business model.

We will continue to focus on hiring and retaining versatile and talented employees, and continue to weight their compensation to stock options rather than cash. (Fact note 7)Fact · 7With hindsightAmazon’s 2003 annual report says: “We moved to restricted stock units as our primary vehicle for equity compensation in late 2002.” Its stated reason echoes the letter’s ownership argument: the units “better align the interests of our shareholders and employees”.SourceAmazon investor relations2003 Annual Report2004 We know our success will be largely affected by our ability to attract and retain a motivated employee base, each of whom must think like, and therefore must actually be, an owner.

We aren’t so bold as to claim that the above is the “right” investment philosophy, but it’s ours (Editorial note 8)Editorial · 8With hindsightThis is a choice of shareholders as much as a message to them. The letter asks investors to check the approach against their own philosophy, and Amazon’s 2001 letter says it attaches the 1997 letter to every annual letter “to help investors decide if Amazon.com is the right kind of investment for them”.SourceAmazon investor relations2001 letter to shareholders2002, and we would be remiss if we weren’t clear in the approach we have taken and will continue to take.

[ … ] Not shown: Customer focus, 1997 results, infrastructure, staff and goals for 1998.

All 8 notes and their sources
  1. But this is Day 1 for the Internet and, if we execute well, for Amazon.com.Fact · 1With hindsightBezos kept the phrase. His 2016 letter, on how to fend off “Day 2”, says “Day 2 is stasis” and closes: “As always, I attach a copy of our original 1997 letter. It remains Day 1.”SourceAmazon investor relations2016 Letter to Shareholders2017Back to the passage
  2. customer and revenue growth, the degree to which our customers continue to purchase from us on a repeat basis, and the strength of our brand.Editorial · 2Known at the timeThe letter tells shareholders which numbers to judge it by before it reports them: customers, repeat purchases and brand, not profit. The results section then reports exactly those. It is a clear standard, and one a company could meet in full while still losing money.SourceAmazonAmazon’s original 1997 letter to shareholders1998Back to the passage
  3. in light of long-term market leadership considerations rather than short-term profitability considerations or short-term Wall Street reactions.Fact · 3With hindsightOn 2 February 2005 Amazon introduced Amazon Prime, $79 a year for unlimited two-day shipping, which Bezos called “expensive for the Company in the short-term”. His letter in the 2005 annual report put Free Super Saver Shipping and Prime among choices “expensive in the short term and—we believe—important and valuable in the long term”.SourcesAmazon press centerAmazon.com Announces Record Free Cash Flow Fueled by Lower Prices and Free Shipping; Introduces New Express Shipping Program -- Amazon Prime2 Feb 2005Amazon investor relations2005 Annual Report2006Back to the passage
  4. Some of these investments will pay off, others will notFact · 4With hindsightOn 13 March 2006 Amazon announced Amazon S3, “storage for the Internet”. In the 2006 annual report Bezos described AWS as a new business for “a new customer set … software developers”. By 2025 AWS revenue was $129 billion, and Andy Jassy wrote of AWS’s early ideas: “Others didn’t succeed.”SourcesAmazon Web ServicesAnnouncing Amazon S3 - Simple Storage Service13 Mar 2006Amazon investor relations2006 Annual Report2007Amazon investor relations2025 Annual Report2026Back to the passage
  5. When forced to choose between optimizing the appearance of our GAAP accounting and maximizing the present value of future cash flowsFact · 5With hindsightIn his 2004 letter Bezos called free cash flow per share Amazon’s “ultimate financial measure” and quoted this line back in shortened form, as “optimizing GAAP accounting”. The 2025 annual report still says: “Our financial focus is on long-term, sustainable growth in free cash flow.”SourcesAmazon investor relations2004 letter to shareholders2005Amazon investor relations2025 Annual Report2026Back to the passage
  6. particularly in a business incurring net losses.Fact · 6Known at the timeAmazon’s Form 10-K for 1997, signed on 30 March 1998, reports net losses of $27.6 million for 1997 and $5.8 million for 1996.SourceAmazon, Form 10-K (investor relations copy)Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 199730 Mar 1998Back to the passage
  7. continue to weight their compensation to stock options rather than cash.Fact · 7With hindsightAmazon’s 2003 annual report says: “We moved to restricted stock units as our primary vehicle for equity compensation in late 2002.” Its stated reason echoes the letter’s ownership argument: the units “better align the interests of our shareholders and employees”.SourceAmazon investor relations2003 Annual Report2004Back to the passage
  8. We aren’t so bold as to claim that the above is the “right” investment philosophy, but it’s oursEditorial · 8With hindsightThis is a choice of shareholders as much as a message to them. The letter asks investors to check the approach against their own philosophy, and Amazon’s 2001 letter says it attaches the 1997 letter to every annual letter “to help investors decide if Amazon.com is the right kind of investment for them”.SourceAmazon investor relations2001 letter to shareholders2002Back to the passage

What happened next

Dated events, each with its source. They are what followed the memo, not proof that it caused them.

  1. 1 yr later

    Bezos’ 1998 letter reports that Amazon launched music, video and gift stores in the US and opened shop in the UK and Germany. The 1997 letter is reprinted after it.

    Amazon investor relations

  2. 6 yrs later

    Amazon reports its first profitable year, with net profit of $35 million for 2003. Its annual report adds that without a change in how it treated intercompany balances it would have had “a small net loss for the year”.

    InfoWorldAmazon investor relations

  3. 7 yrs later

    Amazon introduces Amazon Prime, its first membership programme: unlimited two-day shipping for $79 a year.

    Amazon press center

  4. 8 yrs later

    Amazon Web Services announces Amazon S3, a storage service for developers.

    Amazon Web Services

  5. 28 yrs later

    Amazon’s 2025 annual report shows revenue of $717 billion and free cash flow down from $38 billion to $11 billion, mainly on AI capital spending. Andy Jassy’s letter again reprints the 1997 letter.

    Amazon investor relations

The calls, against the record

Each claim in the memo’s own words, the evidence, and our reading of it. Verdicts are editorial.

  1. Held up

    “We will continue to make investment decisions in light of long-term market leadership considerations rather than short-term profitability considerations or short-term Wall Street reactions.”

    Evidence

    Amazon launched Prime in 2005 as a benefit Bezos called “expensive for the Company in the short-term”, and in 2025 accepted a fall in free cash flow from $38 billion to $11 billion that it put down mainly to AI capital spending.

    Amazon press centerAmazon investor relations

    Our reading Editorial

    Amazon’s own documents describe later decisions in these terms across almost three decades. They show the practice was kept, not that it produced the results, and these sources do not settle whether each investment paid.

  2. Held up

    “When forced to choose between optimizing the appearance of our GAAP accounting and maximizing the present value of future cash flows, we’ll take the cash flows.”

    Evidence

    When Amazon first reported an annual profit, for 2003, it told investors the result should not “be viewed as a material positive event”; its 2004 letter named free cash flow per share its “ultimate financial measure”.

    InfoWorldAmazon investor relationsAmazon investor relations

    Our reading Editorial

    The stance shows in how Amazon reports and explains itself. Free cash flow is a non-GAAP measure Amazon defines, so the commitment also gives management room in how it presents results.

  3. Mixed

    “continue to weight their compensation to stock options rather than cash”

    Evidence

    Amazon moved to restricted stock units as its primary form of equity pay in late 2002, and recorded $19,467 million of stock-based compensation in 2025.

    Amazon investor relationsAmazon investor relations

    Our reading Editorial

    Equity pay continued; stock options as the vehicle did not. These sources do not show how the balance of equity and cash pay changed, or for which employees.

  4. Open

    “Market leadership can translate directly to higher revenue, higher profitability, greater capital velocity, and correspondingly stronger returns on invested capital.”

    Evidence

    Revenue went from $147.8 million in 1997 to $717 billion in 2025, when operating income was $80 billion, an 11.2% margin.

    AmazonAmazon investor relations

    Our reading Editorial

    The revenue and profit are on record. These sources do not measure market leadership, capital velocity or return on invested capital, and cannot show that leadership is what produced the results.

Takeaways Editorial

  1. Name what the principle costs

    Each commitment says what Amazon will give up: reported profit for leadership, the appearance of GAAP results for cash flow, cash pay for equity. A principle that names its cost can be checked later, and Amazon quoted these lines back to shareholders for years.

  2. Choose your shareholders

    The letter asks investors to confirm the approach suits them before the losses arrive. A clear stance filters the owner base as well as informing it, which buys room for decisions that look poor in a single quarter.

  3. Commit to the aim, not the instrument

    The letter tied ownership to stock options; within five years Amazon switched to restricted stock units for the same stated reason. Write commitments at the level of the aim so the method can change without breaking them.

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